Before asking whether consciousness survives death, it helps to clarify what "survival" would mean. At minimum, it would mean that some aspect of the person — their memories, their personality, their subjective experience, their identity — continues to exist after the death of the physical body. The stronger version: that this continuation involves genuine experience, not merely the persistence of information in some inert form.
The materialist assumption — that consciousness is what the brain does — makes survival impossible by definition. If consciousness is a product of brain activity, then when the brain stops, consciousness stops. This is not a conclusion drawn from evidence but an assumption built into the framework. The question of whether consciousness survives death is therefore inseparable from the question of what consciousness fundamentally is. If it is a brain product, it cannot survive. If it is something more fundamental — if it is, as the mystical traditions and some contemporary philosophers argue, the ground rather than the product of physical reality — then survival becomes not only possible but likely.
The hard problem of consciousness is directly relevant here. If consciousness cannot be explained by physical processes — if there is an explanatory gap that no amount of neuroscience can close — then the relationship between consciousness and the brain is not production but correlation. The brain does not produce consciousness; it correlates with it, shapes it, filters it. And a filter is not destroyed when the thing it was filtering is removed. Terminal lucidity — the phenomenon of severely demented patients recovering full mental clarity in the hours before death — is one of the most striking challenges to the production view.